Abstract
We present a utility-driven rationality and a complementary-driven rationality based model, relative to multiple partner coalitions, motivated by relations of dependence and instrumental goal adoption. For this purpose, we analyze social dependency patterns and its corresponding dependency networks. The networks are used as a source of quantitative and qualitative information with which an agent is able to choose the best set of partners and adequate proposals to form coalitions. An e-commerce example is presented, showing the usefulness of the mechanism in real world multi-agent systems.
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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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David, N., Sichman, J.S., Coelho, H. (1999). Extending Social Reasoning to Cope with Multiple Partner Coalitions. In: Garijo, F.J., Boman, M. (eds) Multi-Agent System Engineering. MAAMAW 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 1647. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48437-X_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48437-X_15
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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