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Improved Magic Ink Signatures Using Hints

  • Markus Jakobsson
  • Joy Müller
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1648)

Abstract

We introduce two improvements to the recently proposed so called magic ink DSS signatures. A first improvement is that we re- duce the overhead for tracing without noticeably increasing any other cost. The tracing cost is linear in the number of generated signatures in the original proposal; our improved version reduces this to a logarithmic cost in the common case. A second improvement is that we introduce a method for determining whether forged currency is in circulation, with- out affecting the privacy of honest users.

Our improvements rely on our introducing a so called hint value. This is an encryption of the signature transcript received, submitted by the signature receiver. Part of the processing of this hint value is done using a new technique in which the high costs of secret sharing and robust computation on shared data are avoided by manipulation of encrypted data rather than plaintext. (Whereas the idea of computing on encrypted data is not a new notion in itself, it has to the best of our knowledge not previously been employed to limit the use of costly secret sharing based protocols.)

Keywords

efficiently revokable privacy magic ink DSS hints electronic commerce 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Markus Jakobsson
    • 1
  • Joy Müller
    • 2
  1. 1.Information Sciences Research CenterBell LaboratoriesMurray HillNJ
  2. 2.Fachbereich MathematikJohannes Gutenberg Universität MainzMainz

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