Abstract
A private-key cryptosystem using algebraic codes was presented in CRYPTO 86 [l] and it is referred later [2] and also here as Rao-Nam Scheme. Subsequently, a chosen-plaintext attack was presented by Struik and Tilburg in a rump session of CRYPTO 87 and appears in this issue [2]. This note addresses a major difference between the types of chosen-plaintext attacks on privatekey algebraic code cryptosystems vs. the other more conventional private key schemes, and presents a rebuttal to the conclusions given in [2].
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T.R.N. Rao and K.H. Nam, “Private-Key Algebraic-Code Cryptosystems”, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO’ 86, pp. 35–48, (Editor A.M. Odlyzko), Springer-Verlag 1987.
R. Struik and J. Van Tilburg, “The Rao-Nam Scheme is insecure against a chosen-plaintext attack”, A Rump Session paper, CRYPTO’ 87. A revised version appears in this issue.
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© 1988 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Rao, T.R.N. (1988). On Struik-Tilburg Cryptanalysis of Rao-Nam Scheme. In: Pomerance, C. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’87. CRYPTO 1987. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 293. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48184-2_41
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48184-2_41
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