Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 740)
Making Electronic Refunds Safer
We show how to break an electronic cash protocol due to van Antwerpen (a refinement of the system proposed by Chaum, Fiat, and Naor), and given an alternative protocol that fixes the problem.
KeywordsBlind Signature Check Scheme Electronic Cash Unused Portion Electronic Money
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1993