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Integer Programming and Arrovian Social Welfare Functions

  • Jay Sethuraman
  • Chung-Piaw Teo
  • Rakesh V. Vohra
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2337)

Abstract

We formulate the problem of deciding which preference domains admit a non-dictatorial Arrovian Social Welfare Function as one of verifying the feasibility of an integer linear program. Many of the known results about the presence or absence of Arrovian social welfare functions, impossibility theorems in social choice theory, and properties of majority rule etc., can be derived in a simple and unified way from this integer program. We characterize those preference domains that admit a non-dictatorial, neutral Arrovian social welfare Function and give a polyhedral characterization of Arrovian social welfare functions on single-peaked domains.

Keywords

Integer Programming Majority Rule Valid Inequality Social Welfare Function Hamiltonian Path 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jay Sethuraman
    • 1
  • Chung-Piaw Teo
    • 2
  • Rakesh V. Vohra
    • 3
  1. 1.IEOR DepartmentColumbia UniversityUSA
  2. 2.Department of Decision SciencesNational University of SingaporeSingapore
  3. 3.Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg Graduate School of ManagementNorthwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA

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