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How to Construct Fail-Stop Confirmer Signature Schemes

  • Rei Safavi-Naini
  • Willy Susilo
  • Huaxiong Wang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2119)

Abstract

In a confirmer signature, verification of a signature requires collaboration of the confirmer. A Fail-Stop Confirmer signature provides protection against an enemy with unlimited computational power. A Fail-Stop Confirmer signature is a combination of Fail-Stop Signature and Confirmer Signature Schemes which was first constructed in [15]. In this paper we discuss security issues that will arise in naive construction of such systems.

Keywords

Encryption Scheme Signature Scheme Security Level Overwhelming Probability Digital Signature Scheme 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rei Safavi-Naini
    • 1
  • Willy Susilo
    • 1
  • Huaxiong Wang
    • 1
  1. 1.Centre for Computer Security Research School of Information Technology and Computer ScienceUniversity of WollongongWollongongAustralia

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