Abstract
We present the first undeniable signature schemes where signers are unconditionally secure. In the efficient variants, the security for the recipients relies on a discrete logarithm assumption or on factoring; and in a theoretical version, on claw-free permutation pairs.
Besides, on the one hand, the efficient variants are the first practical cryptographically strong undeniable signature schemes at all. On the other hand, in many cases they are more efficient than previous signature schemes unconditionally secure for the signer.
Interesting new subprotocols are efficient collision-free hash functions based on a discrete logarithm assumption, efficient perfectly hiding commitments for elements of ℤp (p prime), and fairly practical perfect zero-knowledge proofs for arithmetic formulas in ℤp or ℤ2σ.
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© 1992 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Chaum, D., van Heijst, E., Pfitzmann, B. (1992). Cryptographically Strong Undeniable Signatures, Unconditionally Secure for the Signer. In: Feigenbaum, J. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’91. CRYPTO 1991. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 576. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46766-1_38
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