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Semantics for Pollock’s Defeasible Reasoning

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Advanced Topics in Artificial Intelligence (AI 1999)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 1747))

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Abstract

Many researchers have proposed argumentation-based rear-soning as a viable alternative to reasoning systems with a flat epistemological structure. Perhaps one of the longest standing approaches has been in the Oscar project, led by John Pollock. Unfortunately, without a formal semantics, it is often difficult to evaluate the various incarnations of defeasible reasoning. We provide a semantics for Pollocks defeasible reasoning in terms of Bondarenko et al.’s unified framework for default reasoning. We also indicate some internal inconsistencies between the motivation behind and definition’s governing Pollock’s system.

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References

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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Vo, Q.B., Thurbon, J. (1999). Semantics for Pollock’s Defeasible Reasoning. In: Foo, N. (eds) Advanced Topics in Artificial Intelligence. AI 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 1747. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46695-9_27

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46695-9_27

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-66822-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-46695-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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