Perfectly Secure Authorization and Passive Identification for an Error Tolerant Biometric System

  • George I. Davida
  • Yair Frankel
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1746)


A biometric identification system was recently developed and analyzed as a secure mechanism for user authentication. The system provided for the confidentiality, without the use of cryptographic encryption, of the user’s biometric information stored in public verification templates.

Here we demonstrate that the use of majority decoding can enhance the prior techniques in several ways. One enhancement allows the biometric authentication system to leak no information about a user’s biometric when using the proper computational assumptions. Another enhancement is a passive identification system.


Hash Function Random Oracle Legitimate User Biometric System Biometric Template 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • George I. Davida
    • 1
  • Yair Frankel
    • 2
  1. 1.Center for Cryptography, Computer, and Network SecurityUniversity of Wisconsin-MilwaukeeUSA
  2. 2.CertCo Inc.New YorkUSA

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