The Impossibility of Modelling Cooperation in PD-Game

Abstract

The possibility of Cooperation is still a matter of debate in the field of GT. Generally speaking, the emergence of cooperation is seen in the prospect of re-encounter as a forward-looking, calculated, and self-interested decision to cooperate. In this paper, it is argued that neither one-shot nor repeated versions of PD-game can account for a theory of cooperation as distinct from other forms of social action, and particularly bargaining it. It is also argued that in order to provide a theory of cooperation it is necessary to ground social interdependence on a general theory of action and planning. More precisely, two theses are presented and discussed: (i) When the PD-game structure is applied to ideal-type situations, one or other of its formal property does not hold. (ii) A plan-based model of social dependence is necessary for disentangling cooperation from other types of social action, especially bargaining: while PD-game applies to the latter, it does not apply to the former! Even in its repeated version, PD-game cannot account for cooperation as distinct from honest bargaining.