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Observability Analysis - Detecting When Improved Cryptosystems Fail -

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Topics in Cryptology — CT-RSA 2002 (CT-RSA 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2271))

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Abstract

In this paper we show that, paradoxically, what looks like a “universal improvement” or a “straight-forward improvement” which enables better security and better reliability on a theoretical level, may in fact, within certain operational contexts, introduce new exposures and attacks, resulting in a weaker operational cryptosystem. We demonstrate a number of such dangerous “improvements”. This implies that careful considerations should be given to the fact that an implemented cryptosystem exists within certain operational environments (which may enable certain types of tampering and other observed information channels via faults, side-channel attacks or behavior of system operators). We use our case studies to draw conclusions about certain investigations required in studying implementations and suggested improvements of cryptosystems; looking at them in the context of their operating environments (combined with their potential adversarial settings). We call these investigations observability analysis.

Supported in part by the Computer & Communication Research Laboratories, Industrial Technology Research Institute, Republic of China.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Gemplus Card International, Card Security Group, Gémenos, France

    Marc Joye

  2. UCL Crypto Group, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Quisquater Jean-Jacques

  3. Dept of Computer Science, National Central University, Taiwan, R.O.C.

    Yen Sung-Ming

  4. CertCo, New York, NY, USA

    Moti Yung

Authors
  1. Marc Joye
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  2. Quisquater Jean-Jacques
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  3. Yen Sung-Ming
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  4. Moti Yung
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical Engineering, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, 3001, Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium

    Bart Preneel

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Joye, M., Jean-Jacques, Q., Sung-Ming, Y., Yung, M. (2002). Observability Analysis - Detecting When Improved Cryptosystems Fail -. In: Preneel, B. (eds) Topics in Cryptology — CT-RSA 2002. CT-RSA 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2271. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45760-7_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45760-7_2

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-43224-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45760-2

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