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On Hash Function Firewalls in Signature Schemes

Conference paper
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Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2271)

Abstract

The security of many signature schemes depends on the verifier’s assurance that the same hash function is applied during signature verification as during signature generation. Several schemes provide this assurance by appending a hash function identifier to the hash value. We show that such “hash function firewalls” do not necessarily prevent an opponent from forging signatures with a weak hash function and we give “weak hash function” attacks on several signature schemes that employ such firewalls. We also describe a new signature forgery attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 signatures, possible even with a strong hash function, based on choosing a new (and suspicious-looking) hash function identifier as part of the attack.

Keywords

Hash Function Signature Scheme Financial Service Industry Digital Signature Scheme Security Technique 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.RSA LaboratoriesBedfordUSA

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