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Formal Specification and Verification of Mobile Agent Data Integrity Properties: A Case Study

  • Xavier Hannotin
  • Paolo Maggi
  • Riccardo Sisto
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2240)

Abstract

The aim of the work presented in this paper is to check cryptographic protocols for mobile agents against both network intruders and malicious hosts using formal methods. We focus attention on data integrity properties and show how the techniques used for classical message-based protocols such as authentication protocols can be applied to mobile agent systems as well. To illustrate our approach, we use a case study taken from the literature and show how it can be specified and verified using some currently available tools.

Keywords

Model Check Mobile Agent Authentication Protocol Security Property Cryptographic Protocol 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xavier Hannotin
    • 1
  • Paolo Maggi
    • 1
  • Riccardo Sisto
    • 1
  1. 1.Dip. di Automatica e InformaticaPolitecnico di TorinoTorinoITALY

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