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Reasoning about Accountability within Delegation

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Information and Communications Security (ICICS 2001)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2229))

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Abstract

We propose a framework for the analysis of delegation protocols. Our framework allows to analyse how accountability is transferred (or kept) by delegator when she transfers some of her rights to the delegate. The ability to trace how accountability is distributed among principals of a system is crucial in many transactions that have a legal value, because accountability is usually a prerequisite to guarantee other well known security properties (e.g., non repudiation). Our approach starts from the notion of “provability” to formalise accountability. Then, we introduce new specifications for the analysis of delegation protocols and the distribution of credentials necessary to exercise delegated rights.

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References

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© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Crispo, B., Ruffo, G. (2001). Reasoning about Accountability within Delegation. In: Qing, S., Okamoto, T., Zhou, J. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2229. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45600-7_29

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45600-7_29

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-42880-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45600-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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