Abstract
An intelligent intruder model is proposed in this paper. Except for the algebraic abilities to process messages like the Dolev-Yao intruder, it can decide when to generate what terms and whether or not to launch a new session, which principal to choose, and what roles the principal will play based on some strand-added rules. By this heuristic method, we can get a finite state space without the explicit configuration needed by most model checking tools.
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Liu, D., Li, X., Bai, Y. (2001). An Intelligent Intruder Model for Security Protocol Analysis. In: Qing, S., Okamoto, T., Zhou, J. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2229. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45600-7_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45600-7_2
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