Advertisement

FAucS: An FCC Spectrum Auction Simulator for Autonomous Bidding Agents

  • János A. Csirik
  • Michael L. Littman
  • Satinder Singh
  • Peter Stone
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2232)

Abstract

We introduce FAucS, a software testbed for studying automated agent bidding strategies in simulated auctions, specifically the United States FCC wireless frequency spectrum auctions. In addition to the complexity of these auctions, which provides ample opportunities for intelligent approaches to bidding, this type of auction has huge commercial importance, each bringing in billions of dollars to governments around the world. We implement straightforward sample agents in FAucS and use them to replicate known beneficial bidding strategies in this type of auction. We then discuss potential in-depth studies of autonomous bidding agent behaviors using FAucS. The main contribution of this work is the implementation, description, and empirical validation of the FAucS testbed. We present it as a challenging and promising AI research domain.

Keywords

Federal Communication Commission Bidding Strategy Combinatorial Auction Spectrum Auction Sequential Auction 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    J. P. Benoit and V. Krishna. Multiple object auctions with budget constrained bidders. Review of Economic Studies, March 2000. In press, available at http://econ.la.psu.edu/~vkrishna/research.html.
  2. 2.
    Peter C. Cramton. The FCC spectrum auctions: An early assessment. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6(3):431–495, 1997.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Eduard Gimenez-Funes, Lluis Godo, Juan A. Rodriguez-Aguiolar, and Pere Garcia-Calves. Designing bidding strategies for trading agents in electronic auctions. In Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, pages 136–143, 1998.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Amy Greenwald and Jeffrey O. Kephart. Shopbots and pricebots. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 506–511, 1999.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Amy Greenwald and Peter Stone. Autonomous bidding agents in the trading agent competition. IEEE Internet Computing, 5(2):52–60, March/April 2001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Jessica Hall. U.S. carriers likely to be choosy in wireless auction. Reuters Newswire, November 2000.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Paul Klemperer. Auction theory: A guide to the literature. Journal of Economic Surveys, 13(3):227–86, July 1999.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Carolyn Pitchick. Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information. Unpublished manuscript. Under revision November 2000., 1996.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Juan A. Rodriguez-Aguilar, Francisco J. Martin, Pablo Noriega, Pere Garcia, and Carles Sierra. Towards a test-bed for trading agents in electronic auction markets. AI Communications, 2001. In press. Available at http://sinera.iiia.csic.es/~pablo/pncve.html.
  10. 10.
    Peter Stone and Michael L. Littman. Implicit negotiation in repeated games. In Proceedings of The Eighth International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL-2001), August 2001.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Peter Stone, Michael L. Littman, Satinder Singh, and Michael Kearns. ATTac-2000: An adaptive autonomous bidding agent. In Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Autonomous Agents, pages 238–245, 2001.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Robert J. Weber. Making more from less: Strategic demand reduction in the FCC spectrum auctions. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6(3):529–548, 1997.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Michael P. Wellman, Peter R. Wurman, Kevin O'Malley, Roshan Bangera, Shou-de Lin, Daniel Reeves, and William E. Walsh. A trading agent competition. IEEE Internet Computing, 5(2):43–51, March/April 2001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • János A. Csirik
    • 1
  • Michael L. Littman
    • 1
  • Satinder Singh
    • 2
  • Peter Stone
    • 1
  1. 1.AT&T Labs - ResearchFlorham ParkUSA
  2. 2.Syntek CapitalNew YorkUSA

Personalised recommendations