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Enabling Privacy Protection in E-commerce Applications

  • Dennis Kügler
Conference paper
  • 628 Downloads
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2232)

Abstract

Blind signatures are a cryptographic tool that is well suited to enable privacy protecting e-commerce applications. In cryptographic frameworks however, only the major cryptographic tools like digital signatures and ciphers are provided as abstract tools. Cryptographic protocols, especially blind signatures, are not available in those frameworks. We strongly believe that a modular framework is necessary for all cryptographic tools to enable the immediate replacement of an algorithm in the case of its possible breakdown. In this paper, we show how to abstract blind signatures and how to integrate them into the framework of the Java Cryptography Architecture.

Keywords

Signature Scheme Random Oracle Blind Signature Random Oracle Model Secure Socket Layer 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dennis Kügler
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceDarmstadt University of TechnologyDarmstadtGermany

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