Enabling Privacy Protection in E-commerce Applications
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Blind signatures are a cryptographic tool that is well suited to enable privacy protecting e-commerce applications. In cryptographic frameworks however, only the major cryptographic tools like digital signatures and ciphers are provided as abstract tools. Cryptographic protocols, especially blind signatures, are not available in those frameworks. We strongly believe that a modular framework is necessary for all cryptographic tools to enable the immediate replacement of an algorithm in the case of its possible breakdown. In this paper, we show how to abstract blind signatures and how to integrate them into the framework of the Java Cryptography Architecture.
KeywordsSignature Scheme Random Oracle Blind Signature Random Oracle Model Secure Socket Layer
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