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A Reputation System to Increase MIX-Net Reliability

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Information Hiding (IH 2001)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2137))

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Abstract

We describe a design for a reputation system that increases the reliability and thus efficiency of remailer services. Our reputation system uses a MIX-net in which MIXes give receipts for intermediate messages. Together with a set of witnesses, these receipts allow senders to verify the correctness of each MIX and prove misbehavior to the witnesses.

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© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Dingledine, R., Freedman, M.J., Hopwood, D., Molnar, D. (2001). A Reputation System to Increase MIX-Net Reliability. In: Moskowitz, I.S. (eds) Information Hiding. IH 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2137. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45496-9_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45496-9_10

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-42733-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45496-0

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