Abstract
Protecting customer privacy is an important requirement when designing electronic cash systems. However, there is also concern that anonymous cash systems can be misused for criminal activities. Particularly blackmailing is in fact more severe in digital cash systems than in paper-based systems. This is because on the one hand the blackmailer is able to avoid physical contact and on the other hand there are no recognizable note numbers. To prevent such activities, several cash systems have been proposed where one or a collection of trustees can revoke the anonymity of a user. However, this also introduces a serious risk that this revocation ability is misused.
In this paper we show that the problem of user blackmailing can be solved without this risk. In our proposal, instead of a trustee, it is rather the blackmailed person who reveals the required information to trace extorted coins without compromising any of her secrets. We show how to derive such systems from concrete existing proposals for anonymityrevocable cash systems with passive trustee.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Stefan Brands, David Chaum: Distance-Bounding Protocols; Eurocrypt’ 93, LNCS 765,Springer-Verlag, Berlin 1994, 344–359.
Ernest Brickell, Peter Gemmell, David Kravitz: Trustee-based Tracing Extensions to Anonymous Cash and the Making of Anonymous Change; 6th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA) 1995, ACM ress, New York 1995, 457–466.
Stefan Brands: Untraceable O.-line Cash in Wallet with Observers; Crypto’93, LNCS 773, Springer-Verlag, Berlin 1994, 302–318.
Holger Bürk, Andreas Pfitzmann: Digital Payment Systems Enabling Security and Unobservability; Computers & Security 8/5 (1989) 399–416.
David Chaum, Amos Fiat, Moni Naor: Untraceable Electronic Cash; Crypto’ 88, LNCS 403, Springer-Verlag, Berlin 1990, 319–327.
David Chaum: Blind Signatures for untraceable payments; Crypto’ 82, Plenum Press, New York 1983, 199–203.
David Chaum: Security without Identi.cation: Transaction Systems to make Big Brother Obsolete; Communications of the ACM 28/10 (1985) 1030–1044.
David Chaum: Privacy Protected Payments-Unconditional Payer and/or Payee Untraceability; SMART CARD 2000: The Future of IC Cards, IFIP WG 11.6 Conference 1987, North-Holland, Amsterdam 1989, 69–93.
Jan Camenisch, Ueli Maurer, Markus Stadler: Digital Payment Systems with Passive Anonymity-Revoking Trustees; ESORICS’ 96 (4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security), LNCS 1146, Springer-Verlag,Berlin 1996, 33–43.
David Chaum, Torben Pryds Pedersen: Wallet Databases with Observers; Crypto’92, LNCS 740, Springer-Verlag, Berlin 1993, 89–105.
Jan Camenisch, Jean-Marc Piveteau, Markus Stadler: An Efficient Fair Payment System; 3rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, New Delhi, India, March 1996, ACM Press, New York 1996, 88–94.
George Davida, Yair Frankel, Yiannis Tsiounis, Moti Yung: Anonymity Control in E-Cash Systems; 1st International Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC’ 97), LNCS 1318, Springer-Verlag, Berlin 1997, 1–16.
A. Michael Froomkin: Flood Control on the Information Ocean, Living With Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases; Pittsburgh Journal of Law and Commerce 395, 1996. Available online at http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles.
Yair Frankel, Yiannis Tsiounis, Moti Yung: “Indirect Discourse Proofs”: Achieving Efficient Fair O.-Line E-cash; Asiacrypt’96, LNCS 1163, Springer-Verlag, Berlin 1997, 287–300.
Yair Frankel, Yiannis Tsiounis, Moti Yung: Fair O.-Line e-Cash Made Easy; Asiacrypt’ 98, LNCS 1514, Springer-Verlag, Berlin 1998, 257–270.
Markus Jakobsson, Moti Yung: Revocable and Versatile Electronic Money; 3rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ACM Press, New York 1996, 76–87.
Holger Petersen, Guillaume Poupard: Efficient scalable fair cash with o.-line extortion prevention; 1st International Conference on Information and Communications Security (ICICS), LNCS 1334, Springer-Verlag, Berlin 1997, 463–477.
Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner: Strong Loss Tolerance of Electronic Coin Systems; ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 15/2 (1997) 194–213.
Sebastiaan von Solms, David Naccache: On Blind Signatures and Perfect Crimes; Computers & Security 11/6 (1992) 581–583.
Aymeric de Solages, Jacques Traoré: An Efficient Fair O.-Line Electronic Cash System with Extensions to Checks and Wallets with Observers; 2nd International Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC’ 98), LNCS 1465, Springer-Verlag, Berlin 1998, 275–295.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Pfitzmann, B., Sadeghi, AR. (2001). Self-Escrowed Cash against User Blackmailing. In: Frankel, Y. (eds) Financial Cryptography. FC 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1962. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45472-1_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45472-1_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-42700-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45472-4
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive