Advertisement

A Practical Approach Defeating Blackmailing

  • Dong-Guk Han
  • Hye-Young Park
  • Young-Ho Park
  • Sangjin Lee
  • Dong Hoon Lee
  • Hyung-Jin Yang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2384)

Abstract

To simulate the functionalities of the real cash, one of the important requirements of electronic cash systems is the anonymity of users. Unconditional anonymity, however, is also very well suited to support criminals in blackmailing. Recently Kügler and Vogt [6] proposed a payment system based on the blind undeniable signature that protects the privacy of the users and defeats blackmailing with the assumption that the victim of a blackmailing can inform the Bank of a blackmailing before delivering the money and transfer the decryption key(i.e. the secret key of the victim) used in confirmation protocol without being detected by a blackmailer. But the assumption that the victim is always able to inform the bank of blackmailing is very impractical in such cases as kidnapping and special impersonation. In this paper, we propose two practical methods that gives the Bank the information about blackmailing and decryption key without any unpractical assumptions.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    J. Camenisch, U. Mauer, and M. Stadler. Digital payment systems with passive anonymity-revoking trustees., In Computer Security-ESORICS ‘96, volume 1146 of Lecture Notes in Computer Scienc, pages 31–43. Springer-Verlag, 1996.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    G. Davide, Y, Tsiounis, and M. Young. Anonymity control in e-cash systems., In Financial Cryptography’ 97, volume 1318 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 1–16. Springer-Verlag, 1997.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Y. Frankel, Y. Tsiounis, and M. Young. ”Indirect discourse proofs”; Achieving efficient fair off-line e-cash., In Advances in Cryptology-ASIACRYPT ‘96, volume 1163 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 286–300. Springer-Verlag, 1996.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    M. Jakobsson and M. Yung. Revokable and versatile electronic money. In 3rd ACM Conference on Computer Communication Security (CCCS’ 96), pages 76–87. ACM Press, 1996.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    M. Jakobsson and M. Yung. Distributed ”magic ink” signatures. In Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT’ 97, volume 1233 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 450–464. Springer-Verlag, 1997.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    D. Kügler and H. Vogt. Marking: A Privacy Protecting Approach Against Blackmailing., Proceedings PKC 2001, LNCS 1992, Springer-Verlag, 2001, 137–152.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    A.K. Lenstra, E.R. Verheul, The XTR public key system., Proceedings of Crypto 2000, LNCS 1880,Springer-Verlag, 2000, 1–19; available from www.ecstr.com.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    A.K. Lenstra, E.R. Verheul, Key improvements to XTR Proceedings of Asiacrypt 2000, LNCS 1976, Springer-Verlag, 2000, 220–233; available from www.ecstr.com.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    B. von Solms and D. Naccache. On blind signatures and perfect crimes., Computers and Security, 11(6):581–583, 1992.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    M. Stadler. Cryptographic Protocols for Revokable Privacy. PhD Thesis, ETH No. 11651, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, 1996.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dong-Guk Han
    • 1
  • Hye-Young Park
    • 1
  • Young-Ho Park
    • 2
  • Sangjin Lee
    • 1
  • Dong Hoon Lee
    • 1
  • Hyung-Jin Yang
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for Information and Security Technologies(CIST)Korea UniversitySeoulKorea
  2. 2.Dept. of Information Security & SystemSejong Cyber Univ.SeoulKorea

Personalised recommendations