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On Insecurity of the Side Channel Attack Countermeasure Using Addition-Subtraction Chains under Distinguishability between Addition and Doubling

  • Katsuyuki Okeya
  • Kouichi Sakurai
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2384)

Abstract

We show that a randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure against side channel attacks is vulnerable to SPA attack, a kind of side channel attack, under distinguishability between addition and doubling. A side channel attack is an attack that takes advantage of information leaked during execution of a cryptographic procedure. The randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure has been proposed by Oswald-Aigner, and is a random decision inserted into computations. However, its immunity to side channel attacks is still controversial. As for timing attack, a kind of side channel attack, the randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure is also vulnerable. Moreover, compared with other countermeasures against side channel attacks, the randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure, after being improved to prevent side channel attacks, is much slower.

Keywords

Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems Side Channel Attacks Randomized Addition-Subtraction Chains Countermeasure SPA Attack Timing Attack 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Katsuyuki Okeya
    • 1
  • Kouichi Sakurai
    • 2
  1. 1.Systems Development LaboratoryHitachi, Ltd.YokohamaJapan
  2. 2.Graduate School of Information Science and Electrical EngineeringKyushu UniversityFukuokaJapan

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