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Authenticated Operation of Open Computing Devices

  • Paul England
  • Marcus Peinado
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2384)

Abstract

We describe how an open computing device can be extended to allow individual programs and operating systems to have exclusive access to cryptographic keys. This problem is of fundamental importance in areas such as virus protection, protection of servers from network attacks, network administration and copy protection. We seek a system that can be unconditionally robust against software attacks. This requires measures in hardware and in software. Our analysis allows us to minimize the amount of additional hardware needed to support the system.

Keywords

Computing Device Central Processing Unit Access Control Policy Access Control Model Exclusive Access 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul England
    • 1
  • Marcus Peinado
    • 1
  1. 1.MicrosoftRedmondUSA

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