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Simple Negotiating Agents in Complex Games: Emergent Equilibria and Dominance of Strategies

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Intelligent Agents VIII (ATAL 2001)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 2333))

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Abstract

We present a simple model of distributed multi-agent multi-issued contract negotiation for open systems where interactions are competitive and information is private and not shared. We then investigate via simulations two different approximate optimization strategies and quantify the contribution and costs of each towards the quality of the solutions reached. To evaluate the role of knowledge the obtained results are compared to more cooperative strategies where agents share more information. Interesting social dilemmas emerge that suggest the design of incentive mechanisms.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Sloan School of Management, Center for Coordination Science, MIT, Cambridge, MA, 02139, USA

    Peyman Faratin & Mark Klein

  2. New England Complex Systems Institute, 24 Mt. Auburn St., Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA

    Hiroki Sayama & Yaneer Bar-Yam

Authors
  1. Peyman Faratin
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  2. Mark Klein
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  3. Hiroki Sayama
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  4. Yaneer Bar-Yam
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Information and Computing Sciences Intelligent Systems Group, Utrecht University, Padualaan 14 De Uithof, 3508 TB, Utrecht, The Netherlands

    John-Jules Ch. Meyer

  2. Information Sciences Institute, University of Southern California, Henry Salvatori Computer Center 232, Los Angeles, CA, 90089-0781, USA

    Milind Tambe

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Faratin, P., Klein, M., Sayama, H., Bar-Yam, Y. (2002). Simple Negotiating Agents in Complex Games: Emergent Equilibria and Dominance of Strategies. In: Meyer, JJ.C., Tambe, M. (eds) Intelligent Agents VIII. ATAL 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 2333. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45448-9_27

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45448-9_27

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-43858-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45448-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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