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Efficient Sealed-Bid Auctions for Massive Numbers of Bidders with Lump Comparison

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2200))

Abstract

A new scheme for electronic sealed-bid auctions that preserves losing bids is presented. By this scheme, the computational complexity of the opening phase can be reduced to O(log ℓ); previous works required O(N⁗ℓ) or O(N⁗log ℓ) where the number of bidders is N and the range of bids is ℓ. The proposed scheme has two technical points. One is that computational complexity is independent of the number of bidders. The other is a new efficient value-comparing method. These techniques allow our auction scheme to be more than five hundred times faster than previous schemes. Furthermore, our auction scheme can be eleven million times faster than previous schemes if it is assured that auctioneers do not conspire.

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© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Chida, K., Kobayashi, K., Morita, H. (2001). Efficient Sealed-Bid Auctions for Massive Numbers of Bidders with Lump Comparison. In: Davida, G.I., Frankel, Y. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2200. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45439-X_28

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45439-X_28

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-42662-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45439-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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