Abstract
In this paper we present a non-transferable anonymous credential system that is based on the concept of a chameleon certificate. A chameleon certificate is a special certificate that enjoys two interesting properties. Firstly, the owner can choose which attributes of the certificate to disclose. Moreover, a chameleon certificate is multi-show in the sense that several uses of the same chameleon certificate by the same user cannot be linked together.
We adopt the framework of Brands [2] and our construction improves the results of Camenisch et al. [5] and Verheul [16] since it allows the owner of a certificate to prove general statements on the attributes encoded in the certificate and our certificates enjoy the multi-show property.
Supported by a grant from the Università di Salerno and by Young Researchers grants from the CNR.
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Persiano, P., Visconti, I. (2003). An Anonymous Credential System and a Privacy-Aware PKI. In: Safavi-Naini, R., Seberry, J. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2727. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45067-X_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45067-X_3
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