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Key Recovery Attacks on the RMAC, TMAC, and IACBC

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Book cover Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2003)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2727))

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Abstract

The RMAC[6] is a variant of CBC-MAC, which resists birthday attacks and gives provably full security. The RMAC uses 2k-bit keys and the size of the RMAC is 2n, where n is the size of underlying block cipher. The TMAC[10] is the improved MAC scheme of XCBC[4] such that it requires (k +n)-bit keys while the XCBC requires (k +2n)-bit keys. In this paper, we introduce trivial key recovery attack on the RMAC with about 2n computations, which is more realistic than the attacks in [9]. Also we give a new attack on the TMAC using about 2n/2+1 texts, which can recover an (k + n)-bit key. However this attack can not be applied to the XCBC. Furthermore we analyzed the IACBC mode[8], which gives confidentiality and message integrity.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Cryptographic Technology Team, Korea Information Security Agency(KISA), 78, Karag-Dong, Songpa-Gu, Seoul, Korea

    Jaechul Sung

  2. Center for Information Security Technologies(CIST), Korea University, Anam-Dong 5-ga, Sungbuk-Gu, Seoul, Korea

    Deukjo Hong & Sangjin Lee

Authors
  1. Jaechul Sung
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  2. Deukjo Hong
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  3. Sangjin Lee
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Information Technology and Computer Science, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, 2522, Australia

    Rei Safavi-Naini  & Jennifer Seberry  & 

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Sung, J., Hong, D., Lee, S. (2003). Key Recovery Attacks on the RMAC, TMAC, and IACBC. In: Safavi-Naini, R., Seberry, J. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2727. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45067-X_23

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45067-X_23

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-40515-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45067-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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