Abstract
We study the number of steps required to reach a pure Nash Equilibrium in a load balancing scenario where each job behaves selfishly and attempts to migrate to a machine which will minimize its cost. We consider a variety of load balancing models, including identical, restricted, related and unrelated machines. Our results have a crucial dependence on the weights assigned to jobs. We consider arbitrary weights, integer weights, K distinct weights and identical (unit) weights. We look both at an arbitrary schedule (where the only restriction is that a job migrates to a machine which lowers its cost) and specific efficient schedulers (such as allowing the largest weight job to move first).
Supported by the Deutsch Institute
Supported in part by a grant from the Israel Science Foundation.
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Even-Dar, E., Kesselman, A., Mansour, Y. (2003). Convergence Time to Nash Equilibria. In: Baeten, J.C.M., Lenstra, J.K., Parrow, J., Woeginger, G.J. (eds) Automata, Languages and Programming. ICALP 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2719. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45061-0_41
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45061-0_41
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