Security Analysis and Applications of Standard Key Agreement Protocols

  • Soohyun Oh
  • Jin Kwak
  • Seungwoo Lee
  • Dongho Won
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2668)


The use of cryptographic system to provide the privacy of transmitted message over network is increasing gradually. A key agreement protocol is the most important part to establish a secure cryptographic system and the effort to standardize the key agreement protocols is in rapid progress. In this paper, we study properties and operation of standard key agreement protocols and analyze the security of their protocols under several active attacker models such as active impersonation, key-compromised impersonation, (full/half ) forward secrecy, known-key passive attack, known-key impersonation attack and so on. Then, we suggest the standard for selecting key agreement protocols for each application, and find the most suitable key agreement protocol for each application.


Hash Function Elliptic Curve Forward Secrecy Cryptographic System Communication Overload 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Soohyun Oh
    • 1
  • Jin Kwak
    • 1
  • Seungwoo Lee
    • 1
  • Dongho Won
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Information and Communications EngineeringSungkyunkwan UniversityKorea

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