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Traffic Analysis: Protocols, Attacks, Design Issues, and Open Problems

  • Jean-François Raymond
Chapter
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2009)

Abstract

We present the trafic analysis problem and expose the most important protocols, attacks and design issues. Afterwards, we propose directions for further research. As we are mostly interested in efficient and practical Internet based protocols, most of the emphasis is placed on mix based constructions. The presentation is informal in that no complex definitions and proofs are presented, the aim being more to give a thorough introduction than to present deep new insights.

Keywords

Oblivious Transfer Traffic Analysis Exit Node Secure Multi Party Computation Private Information Retrieval 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jean-François Raymond
    • 1
  1. 1.Zero-Knowledge Systems, Inc.USA

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