Computational Politics: Electoral Systems

  • Edith Hemaspaandra
  • Lane A. Hemaspaandra
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1893)


This paper discusses three computation-related results in the study of electoral systems:
  1. 1.

    Determining the winner in Lewis Carroll’s 1876 electoral system is complete for parallel access to NP [22].

  2. 2.

    For any electoral system that is neutral, consistent, and Condorcet, determining the winner is complete for parallel access to NP [21].

  3. 3.

    For each census in US history, a simulated annealing algorithm yields provably fairer (in a mathematically rigorous sense) congressional apportionments than any of the classic algorithms—even the algorithm currently used in the United States [24].



Power Index Electoral System Condorcet Winner Electoral College Election Scheme 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Edith Hemaspaandra
    • 1
  • Lane A. Hemaspaandra
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceRochester Institute of TechnologyRochesterUSA
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of RochesterRochesterUSA

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