Abstract
In 1984, H.C. Williams introduced a public key cryptosystem whose security is as intractable as factorization.Motivated by some strong and interesting cryptographic properties of the intrinsic structure of this scheme, we present a practical modification thereof that has very strong security properties. We establish, and prove, a generalization of the “sole-samplability ” paradigm of Zheng-Seberry (1993)which is reminiscent of the plaintext-awareness concept of Bellare et. al. The assumptions that we make are both well-defined and reasonable. In particular, we do not model the functions as random oracles. In essence, the proof of security is based on the factorization problem of any large integer n =pq and Canetti 's “ oracle hashing ” construction introduced in 1997. Another advantage of our system is that we do not rely on any special structure of the modulus n =pq, nor do we require any specific form of the primes p and q . As our main result we establish a model which implies security attributes even stronger than semantic security against chosen ciphertext attacks.
Supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), P 13088-MAT and P 14472-MAT
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Müller, S. (2001). On the Security o a Williams Based Public Key Encryption Scheme. In: Kim, K. (eds) Public Key Cryptography. PKC 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1992. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44586-2_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44586-2_1
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