An Equitably Fair On-line Auction Scheme

  • Emmanouil Magkos
  • Mike Burmester
  • Vassilios Chrissikopoulos
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1875)


We present a sealed-bid electronic auction scheme that is equitably fair for the bidders and the seller. In this scheme, the interests of both the bidders and the seller are safeguarded: the identity of the non-winning bidders and their bidding behavior are protected (anonymity), and the bidders cannot withdraw their bids without being detected (non-repudiation). The scheme fulfills the requirements of a secure auction scheme and is verifiable. It extends the Stubblebine & Syverson auction scheme that is not equitably fair (it does not prevent bid withdrawals). Our scheme employs a Registrar and an Auctioneer for which no special trust assumptions are made.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    Asokan, N., Shoup, V., Waidner, M.: Asynchronous Protocols for Optimistic Fair Exchange. In: Proceedings of 1998 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE CS Press (1998) 86–99Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Ben-Or, M., Goldwasser, S., Wigderson, A.: Completeness Theorems for Non-Cryptographic Fault-Tolerant Distributed Computing. In: 20th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing. ACM (1988) 1–10Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Boneh, D., Franklin, M.: Efficient Generation of RSA keys. In: Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 97, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1233. Springer-Verlag (1997) 425–439CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Burmester, M., Desmedt, Y., Seberry, J.: Equitable Key Escrow with Limited Time Span (or How to Enforce Time Expiration Cryptographically). In: Advances in Cryptology-ASIACRYPT’ 98, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1514. Springer-Verlag (1998) 380–391CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Camp, J., Harkavy, M., Tygar, K., Yee, B.:Anonymous Atomic Transactions. In: 2nd USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce. USENIX Press (1996) 123–133Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Certmail: The Certified Electronic Mail System,
  7. 7.
    Chaum, D., Fiat, A., Naor, M.: Untraceable Electronic Cash. In: Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO 88, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1440. Springer-Verlag (1988) 319–327Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Chaum, D.: The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability. Journal of Cryptology, Vol. 1(1), (1988) 65–75zbMATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Chaum, D.: Security Without Identification: Transaction Systems to Make Big Brother Obsolete. Communications of the ACM, Vol. 28(10), (1985) 1030–1044CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Chaum, D.: Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital Pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, Vol. 24(2), (1981) 84–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Chor, B., Goldwasser, S., Micali, S., Awerbuch, B.: Verifiable Secret Sharing and Achieving Simultaneity in the Presence of Faults. In: 26th IEEE Symposium on the Foundations of Computer Science. IEEE Press (1985) 383–395Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Cocks, K.: Split Knowledge Generation of RSA Parameters. In: 6th IMA Conference on Cryptography and Coding. Springer-Verlag (1997) 89–95Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Community Connexion, Inc.,
  14. 14.
    Cottrell, L.: Mixmaster and Remailer Attacks. Available from
  15. 15.
    Crampton, P.: Ascending Auctions. European Economic Review, Vol. 42, (1998) 745–756CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. 16.
    Diffie, W., Hellman, M.: New Directions in Cryptography. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. 22(6), (1976) 644–654zbMATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  17. 17.
    Franklin, M., Reiter, M.: The Design and Implementation of a Secure Auction Service. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, Vol. 22(5), (1996) 302–311CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. 18.
    Franklin, M., Reiter, M.: Verifiable Signature Sharing. In: Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT 95, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 921. Springer-Verlag (1995) 50–63Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Friedman, D., Rust, J.: The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories and Evidence. Addison-Wesley, MA (1993)Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    Goldschlag, D., Reed, M., Syverson, P.: Onion Routing for Anonymous and Private Communications. Communications of the ACM, Vol. 42(2), (1999) 39–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. 21.
    Harkavy, M., Kikuchi, H., Tygar, J.: Electronic Auctions with Private Bids. In: 3rd USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce. USENIX Press (1998) 61–74Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    Harkavy, M., Kikuchi, H., Tygar, J.: Multi-Round Anonymous Auction Protocols. In: 1st IEEE Workshop on Dependable and Real-Time E-Commerce Systems (DARE 99). IEEE Press (1999) 62–69Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Kilian, J., Petrank, E.: Identity Escrow. In:Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 98, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1462. Springer-Verlag (1998) 169–185CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. 24.
    Klemperer, P.: Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature. Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 13, (1999) at
  25. 25.
    Kumar, M., Feldman, S.: Internet Auctions. In: 3rd USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce. USENIX Press (1998) 49–60Google Scholar
  26. 26.
    The Lucent Personalized Web Assistant. Available from
  27. 27.
    McCabe, K., Rassenti, S., Smith, V.: Auction Institutional Design: Theory and Behavior of Simultaneous Multiple-Unit Generalizations of the Dutch and English Auctions. American Economic Review, Vol. 80(5), (1990) 1276–1283Google Scholar
  28. 28.
    Reiter, M., Rubin, A.: Crowds, Anonymity for Web Transactions. DIMACS Technical Report 97-15, (1997) available from
  29. 29.
    Rivest, R., Shamir, A., Wagner, D.: Time-Lock Puzzles and Timed-Release Crypto. LCS Tech. Memo MIT/LCS/TR-684, (1996) available from
  30. 30.
    Schneier, B.: Applied Cryptography, Second Edition: Protocols, Algorithm and Source Code in C. John Wiley and Sons (1996)Google Scholar
  31. 31.
    Shamir, A.: How to Share a Secret. Communications of the ACM, Vol. 22(11), (1979) 612–613zbMATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  32. 32.
    Stajano, F., Anderson, R.: The Cocaine Auction Protocol: On the Power of Anonymous Broadcast. In: 3rd International Workshop on Information Hiding. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1768. Springer-Verlag (1999) 434–448CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. 33.
    Stubblebine, S., Syverson, P.: Fair On-line Auctions Without Special Trusted Parties. In: Financial Cryptography 99, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1468. Springer-Verlag (1999) 231–241Google Scholar
  34. 34.
    Surety Technologies, Inc.,
  35. 35.
    Ungar, L., Parkes, D., Foster, D.: Cost and Trust Issues in On-line Auctions. In: Agents-98 Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Trading, Minneapolis. MN (1998) 161–172Google Scholar
  36. 36.
    Vickrey, W.: Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. Journal of Finance, Vol. 16(8), (1961) 8–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. 37.
    Wellman, M., Wurman, P.: Real time Issues for Internet Auctions. In: 1st IEEE Workshop DARE 98, (1998) available from
  38. 38.
    You, C., Zhou, J., Lam, K.: On the Efficient Implementation of Fair Non-Repudiation. In: Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. IEEE CS Press (1997) 126–132Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Emmanouil Magkos
    • 1
  • Mike Burmester
    • 1
    • 2
  • Vassilios Chrissikopoulos
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of InformaticsUniversity of PireausGreece
  2. 2.Information Security Group, Royal HollowayUniversity of LondonUK

Personalised recommendations