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Algorithms for Rational Agents

  • Amir Ronen
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1963)

Abstract

Many recent applications of interest involve self-interested participants. As such participants, termed agents, may manipulate the algorithm for their own benefit, a new challenge emerges: The design of algorithms and protocols that perform well when the agents behave according to their own self-interest.

This led several researchers to consider computational models that are based on a sub-field of game-theory and micro-economics called mechanism design.

This paper introduces this topic mainly through examples. It demonstrates that in many cases selfishness can be satisfactorily overcome, surveys some of the recent trends in this area and presents new challenging problems.

The paper is mostly based on classic results from mechanism design as well as on recent work by the author and others.

Keywords

Rational Agent Multiagent System Mechanism Design Combinatorial Auction Participation Constraint 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Amir Ronen
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Computer Science and EngineeringThe Hebrew University of JerusalemIsrael

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