Abstract
All known digital signature schemes can be forged by anyone having enough computing power. For a finite set of participants, we can overcome this weakness.
We present a polynomial time protocol in which a participant can convince (with an exponentially small error probability) any other participant that his signature is valid. Moreover, such a convinced participant can convince any other participant of the signature’s validity, without interaction with the original signer.
An extension allows, in most cases, a participant who receives a signature from any source to convince each other participant of its validity. If a participant cannot use the signature to convince others, he knows so when he receives it.
Research conducted at CWI
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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Chaum, D., Roijakkers, S. (1991). Unconditionally-Secure Digital Signatures. In: Menezes, A.J., Vanstone, S.A. (eds) Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO’ 90. CRYPTO 1990. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 537. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-38424-3_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-38424-3_15
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