Abstract
In this work we analyze the time evolution of the wealth of a group of agents in a public-investment-game scenario. These are part of a small-world network, where connections depend on a probability p and investment depends on a binary variable σ (motivation). This variable tries to emulate one’s perception of other players’ actions. We study the effect of the connectivity on the wealth of the group as well as the dynamics when idyosincratic types are introduced in the game.
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da Silva, R., Baraviera, A.T., Dahmen, S.R., Bazzan, A.L.C. (2006). Dynamics of a Public Investment Game: from Nearest-Neighbor Lattices to Small-World Networks. In: Bruun, C. (eds) Advances in Artificial Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 584. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-37249-0_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-37249-0_16
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