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TMAC: Two-Key CBC MAC

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Topics in Cryptology — CT-RSA 2003 (CT-RSA 2003)

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Abstract

In this paper, we propose TMAC. TMAC is a refinement of XCBC such that it requires only two keys while XCBC requires three keys. More precisely, TMAC requires only (k + n)-bit keys while XCBC requires (k + 2n)-bit keys, where k is the key length of the underlying block cipher E and n is its block length. We achieve this by using a universal hash function and the cost is almost negligible. Similar to XCBC, the domain is 0, 1. and it requires no extra invocation of E even if the size of the message is a multiple of n.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer and Information Sciences, Ibaraki University, 4-12-1 Nakanarusawa, 316-8511, Hitachi, Ibaraki, Japan

    Kaoru Kurosawa & Tetsu Iwata

Authors
  1. Kaoru Kurosawa
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  2. Tetsu Iwata
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Gemplus, Card Security Group, La Vigie, Avenue du Jujubier, ZI Athélia IV, 13705, La Ciotat Cedex, France

    Marc Joye

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Kurosawa, K., Iwata, T. (2003). TMAC: Two-Key CBC MAC. In: Joye, M. (eds) Topics in Cryptology — CT-RSA 2003. CT-RSA 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2612. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36563-X_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36563-X_3

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00847-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36563-1

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