Abstract
We extend distributed algorithmic mechanism design by considering a new model that allows autonomous nodes executing a distributed mechanism to strategically deviate from the prescribed protocol. Our goal is to motivate agents to contribute to a global objective and resist disruption by a limited number of malicious irrational agents, augmenting market incentives with cryptographic primitives to make certain forms of behavior computationally infeasible. Several techniques for distributing market computation among autonomous agents are illustrated using a marginal cost mechanism for multicast cost sharing from [3].
This work was supported by the DoD University Research Initiative (URI) program administered by the Office of Naval Research under Grant N00014-01-1-0795 and also ONR MURI grant N00014-97-1-0505, Semantic Consistency in Information Exchange.
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Mitchell, J.C., Teague, V. (2003). Autonomous Nodes and Distributed Mechanisms. In: Okada, M., Pierce, B.C., Scedrov, A., Tokuda, H., Yonezawa, A. (eds) Software Security — Theories and Systems. ISSS 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2609. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36532-X_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36532-X_5
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