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Offline Payments with Auditable Tracing

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2357))

Abstract

Tracing is an important mechanism to prevent crimes in anonymous payment systems. However, it is also a threat to the customer’s privacy as long as its application cannot be controlled. Relying solely on trusted third parties for tracing is inadequate, as there are no strong guarantees that deanonymizations are only applied legally.

A recent tracing concept is auditable tracing, where the customer has the power to control the deanonymization. With auditable tracing no trust is required, while it offers comparable tracing mechanisms.

We present the first off-line payment system with auditable tracing. Our payment system supports coin and owner tracing as well as self deanonymization in the case of blackmailing.

This work was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) as part of the PhD program (Graduiertenkolleg) “Enabling Technologies for Electronic Commerce” at Darmstadt University of Technology.

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© 2003 IFCA/Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Kügler, D., Vogt, H. (2003). Offline Payments with Auditable Tracing. In: Blaze, M. (eds) Financial Cryptography. FC 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2357. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36504-4_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36504-4_19

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00646-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36504-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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