Abstract
Covert channels exist in most communications systems and allow individuals to communicate truly undectably. However, covert channels are seldom used due to their complexity. A protocol for sending data over a common class of low-bandwidth covert channels has been developed. The protocol is secure against attack by powerful adversaries. The design of a practical system implementing the protocol on a standard platform (Linux) exploiting a channel in a common communications system (TCP timestamps) is presented. A partial implementation of this system has been accomplished.
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Giffin, J., Greenstadt, R., Litwack, P., Tibbetts, R. (2003). Covert Messaging through TCP Timestamps. In: Dingledine, R., Syverson, P. (eds) Privacy Enhancing Technologies. PET 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2482. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36467-6_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36467-6_15
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