Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

International Conference on Security in Communication Networks

SCN 2002: Security in Communication Networks pp 133–145Cite as

On a Class of Key Agreement Protocols Which Cannot Be Unconditionally Secure

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:

  • 702 Accesses

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2576))

Abstract

In [5] a new key agreement protocol called CHIMERA was introduced which was supposed to be unconditionally secure. In this paper an attack against CHIMERA is described which needs little memory and computational power and is successful almost with probability 1. The bug in the security proof in [5] is explained. Further, it is shown that a whole class of CHIMERA-like key agreement protocols cannot be unconditionally secure.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. G. Brassard: Modern Cryptology: A Tutorial. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 325, Springer, New York (1988).

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  2. U. Maurer: Secret Key Agreement by Public Discussion from Common Information. IEEE Transaction on Information Theory 39 (1993), 739–742.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  3. U. Maurer: Information Theoretic Cryptography. In: M. Wiener (ed.): Crypto’ 99. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1666, Springer, Berlin (1999), 47–64.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  4. A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, S. C. Vanstone: Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, Boca Raton (1987).

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  5. C. Prisette: Unconditionally Secure Key Agreement Protocol. In: B. Honary (ed.): Cryptography and Coding 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2260, Springer, Berlin (2001), 277–293.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Godesberger Allee 185-189, 53175, Bonn, Germany

    Frank Niedermeyer & Werner Schindler

Authors
  1. Frank Niedermeyer
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Werner Schindler
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Informatica ed Applicazioni, Università di Salerno, Via S. Allende, 84081, Baronissi (SA), Italy

    Stelvio Cimato  & Giuseppe Persiano  & 

  2. Dept. of Computer Engineering and Informatics, Computer Technology Institute and University of Patras, 26500, Rio, Greece

    Clemente Galdi

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Niedermeyer, F., Schindler, W. (2003). On a Class of Key Agreement Protocols Which Cannot Be Unconditionally Secure. In: Cimato, S., Persiano, G., Galdi, C. (eds) Security in Communication Networks. SCN 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2576. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36413-7_10

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36413-7_10

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00420-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36413-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation