Abstract
Approval balloting is applied to the problem of electing a representative committee. We demonstrate several procedures for determining a committee based on approval ballots, paying particular attention to weighting methods that can reduce the influence of voters with extreme views. We show that a general class of voting systems based on approval ballots can be implemented through analysis of appropriate tables. A by-product of this procedure is a clarification of the complexity of these systems.
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© 2006 Springer Berlin · Heidelberg
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Kilgour, D.M., Brams, S.J., Sanver, M.R. (2006). How to Elect a Representative Committee Using Approval Balloting. In: Simeone, B., Pukelsheim, F. (eds) Mathematics and Democracy. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-35605-3_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-35605-3_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-35603-5
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