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Integrierte Board Management Dimension

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Integrierte Corporate Governance

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Literatur

  1. Böckli (2002), Präsentation.

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  2. Carter/ Lorsch (2004:78) haben für die USA folgende Kennzahlen für das minimale zeitliche Board Engagement ermittelt:

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  3. Vgl. hierzu Beatty (2003:7), der immer die spezifische Forderung stellt: „Devote time to serve effectively as a director by not over-committing to other corporate and non-profit boards.“

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  4. Vgl. hierzu die „Targeted Selektion“-Interviewmethode von Byham (1977).

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  5. Ward (2003:63), vgl. ferner Gray (1994).

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  6. Vgl. Beatty (2003:33).

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  7. Vgl. Lorsch/ Spaulding (1999:11ff); ferner George (2002:22f). 9 Beatty (2002).

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  8. Vgl. Lorsch et al (1999:11ff).

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  9. Vgl. Carter/ Lorsch (2004:160f).

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  10. Vgl. Lorsch et al (1999:11ff).

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  11. Vgl. Lorsch et al (1999:11ff).

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  12. „Seventy-five per cent of share options issued by major companies in America went to the top five executives.“ Newing (2003:6).

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  13. Lazear und Rosen (2005).

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  14. Vgl. Osterloh in Noetzli (2004:63).

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  15. Dazu können entweder faktorenanalytische Kompensationsvergleichsstudien wie z. B. von TPF&C oder der Ansatz von DuPont angewandt werden: Hierzu Ed Woolard (CFO von DuPont): „We no longer base the compensation of the CEO on what other CEOs are getting. Instead, we use the pay of the senior vice-presidents — the people who actually run the business — as a benchmark and then decide how much more the CEO ought to get. The CEO isn’t going to overpay the SVPs, because he has to make a return on them. So that avoids the upward spiral.“ Elson (2003:72).

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  16. Higgs Report, para. 12.24, zit. in Carter/ Lorsch (2004:135).

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  17. Böckli (1992:412).

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  18. Vgl. hierzu zum Beispiel Porter (1992:81): „Compensation systems need to move in the direction of linking pay more closely to long-term company prosperity and to actions that improve the company’s competitive position.“

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  19. Vgl. Healy (2003:168ff).

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  20. Vgl. hierzu die „guidelines for designing stockoptions“ von Brandes et al. (2003).

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  21. Vgl. Healy (2003:168ff).

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  22. Higgs in Merson (2003:51).

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  23. Gray (2002:43), ferner Elson (2003:73). Danach gibt es drei Gründe Aktienoptionen durch Aktien zu ersetzen: „First, we’ve got to link pay to performance. But most stock option plans are adopted for accounting reasons and are not geared for performance. Second, we want executives to hold on to equity positions longer. Executives paid in options can get out of their stock right away after they have exercised their options. Third, we want executives to bear some downside risk, and stock options, in the main do not do that.“

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  24. Beatty (2003:10).

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  25. Bernhardt/ Witt (1997).

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  26. Garratt (2003:234).

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  27. Margerison/ McCann (1985): Dabei wird unlogischerweise „kreativ“ und praktisch“ als Gegensatzpaar betrachtet.

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  28. Hilb/ Müller/ Wehrli (2003).

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  29. Hilb/ Müller/ Wehrli (2003).

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  30. Dubs (2003:7f).

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  31. Dubs (2003:7f).

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  32. Beatty (2003:17), ferner Ward (2003:27).

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  33. Vgl. Carter/ Lorsch (2004:149).

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  34. Vgl. Carter/ Lorsch (2004:131).

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  35. Imhoff (2003:123).

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  36. Eine Untersuchung von Conyon/ Peck (1998) hat dabei ergeben, dass „... top management pay and corporate performance are more aligned in companies with outsider-dominated boards and remuneration committees.“

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  37. Michaels (2003:9).

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  38. KPMG (2002:77).

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  39. KPMG (2002:88).

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  40. Vgl. hierzu auch Beatty (2003:19); ferner Carter/Lorsch (2004:107).

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  41. Vgl. Carter/ Lorsch (2004:89).

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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(2006). Integrierte Board Management Dimension. In: Integrierte Corporate Governance. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-32744-4_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-32744-4_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-32741-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32744-8

  • eBook Packages: Business and Economics (German Language)

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