Summary
In this paper I study a class of two-player games, in which both players’ action sets are [0, 1] and their payoff functions are continuous in joint actions and quasi-concave in own actions. I show that a no-improper-crossing condition is both necessary and sufficient for a finite subset A of [0, 1] × [0, 1] to be the set of Nash equilibria of such a game.
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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Zhou, L. (2006). The structure of the Nash equilibrium sets of standard 2-player games. In: Aliprantis, C.D., Matzkin, R.L., McFadden, D.L., Moore, J.C., Yannelis, N.C. (eds) Rationality and Equilibrium. Studies in Economic Theory, vol 26. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-29578-X_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-29578-X_3
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Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-29577-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-29578-5
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