Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Wirtschaftspolitik pp 409–436Cite as

Delegations-probleme in ReprÄsentativen Demokratien

  • Chapter

  • 6144 Accesses

Part of the book series: Springer-Lehrbuch ((SLB))

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   29.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

LITERATUR ZU KAPITEL 9

  • Ahlheim, M., Rose, M., 1992, Messung individueller Wohlfahrt, 2. Aufl., Heidelberg et al.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aldrich, J.H., 1997, When is it rational to vote?, in: Mueller, D.C., (ED.) Perspectives on Public Choice, a Handbook, Cambridge, 373–390.

    Google Scholar 

  • Akerlof, G.A., 1970, The Market for "Lemons": Quality, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488–500.

    Google Scholar 

  • Albert, H., 1972, Wertfreiheit als methodisches Prinzip, Zur Frage der Notwendigkeit einer normativen Sozialwissenschaft, in: Topitsch, E. (HRSG.), Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, 8. Aufl., Köln, Berlin, 181–210.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alchian, A.A, 1988, Property Rights, in: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., Newman, P., (eds.), The New Palgrave, Vol 3, 1031–1034. Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aliprantis, C., Brown D., Burkinshaw, O., 1989, Existence and Optimality of Competitive Equilibria, Berlin et al.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allais, M., 1953, Le Comportement de L’homme Rationel Devant le Risque. Critique des Postulates et Axiomes de Làcole Americaine, Econometrrica 21, 503–546.

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, S. P., J. K. Goeree, C. A. Holt, 1998, A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision errors in public good games; Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 70: 297–323.

    Google Scholar 

  • Andreoni, J., 1988, Why Free Ride? Strategie and Learning in Public Good Experiments, Journal of Public Economics, 37, 291–304.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arnott, R., De Palma, A., Lindsey, R. 1993, A Structural Model of Peak-Period Congestion: A Traffic Bottleneck with Elastic Demand, American Economic Review, 83, 161–179.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arrow, K.J., 1962, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in: NBER conference no. 13, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, Princeton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arrow, K.J., 1963, Social Choice and Individual Values, New York 1951; 2. Aufl.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arrow, K., AND Hahn F., 1971, General Competitive Theory, San Francisco.

    Google Scholar 

  • Austen-smith, D., 1997, Interest Groups: Money, Information and influence, in: Mueller, D.C., (ED.) Perspectives on Public Choice, a Handbook, Cambridge, 296–321.

    Google Scholar 

  • Averch, H.A., Johnson, L.O., 1962, Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraint, American Economic Review, 52, 1053–1069.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bailey, E.E., 1981, Contestability and the Design of Regulatory and Antitrust Policy, American Economic Review, 71, 179–183.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bailey, E. E., Baumol, W. J., 1984, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets, Yale Journal of Regulation, 1, 111–137.

    Google Scholar 

  • Balinsky, M., Young, H.P., 1982, Fair Representation, New Haven.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bartling, H. 1984, Landwirtschaft, in: Oberender, P., (HRSG.), Marktstruktur und Wettbewerb in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, München.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baumol, W. J., Panzar, J. C., Willig, R. D., 1982, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industrial Structure, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker, G.S., 1983, A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 371–400.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berg, H., 1990, Der Zusammenschluß "Daimler-Benz/MBB", WiSt, Jg. 19, Hft. 12, 643–655.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berg, H., 1992, Wettbewerbspolitik, in: Vahlens Kompendium der Volkswirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftspolitik, Bd. 2, 5. Aufl. München.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, P., Breyer, F., 1994, Grundlagen der Politischen Ökonomie, Bd. 2, 3. Auflage, Tübingen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Black, D., 1948, On the Rational of Group Decision Making, Journal of Political Economy, 56, 23–34.

    Google Scholar 

  • BLaug, M., 1980, The Methodology of Economics, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blin, J.M., Satterthwaite, M.A., 1978, Individual Decision and Group Decision, Journal of Public Economics, 10, 247–67.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boadway, R.W., 1974, The Welfare Foundations of Cost-Benefit-Analysis, Economic Journal, 84, 541–556.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bolton, G. E., A. Ockenfels, 2000, ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition, American Economic Review, 90, 166–93.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bolton, G.E., J. Brandts, A. Ockenfels, 1998, Measuring motivations for the reciprocal responses observed in a simple dilemma game, Experimental Economics 1, pp. 207–219.

    Google Scholar 

  • Braeutigam, R. R., 1989, Optimal Policies for Natural Monopolies, in: Schmalensee, R., Willig, R. D., (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Amsterdam et al. Vol. II, Kap. 23.

    Google Scholar 

  • Braid, R.M., 1990, Uniform versus Peak-Load Pricing of a Bottleneck with Elastic Demand, Journal of Urban Economics, 26, 320–327.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brosig, J., Ockenfels, A., Weimann, J., 2003, The Effect of Communication Media on Cooperation, in: German Economic Review, 4, 217–241.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, J., 1954, Social Choice, Democracy and Free Markets, Journal of Political Economy, 62, 114–123.

    Google Scholar 

  • BUNDESREGIERUNG 1993: Agrarbericht 1993. Agrar-und ernährungspolitischer Bericht der Bundesregierung, Bundestagsdrucksache 12/4257, Bonn.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carroll, K.A., 1990, Bureaucratic Competition and Inefficiency: A Review of the Evidence, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 13, 21–40.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carson, R.T., 1994, A Bibliography of Contingent Valuation Studies and Papers, La Jolla.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carson, R.T., Constructed Markets, in: Braden, J.B., Kolstad, C.D., (eds.), Measuring the Demand for Environmental Quality, Amsterdam et al. 1991, S. 121–161.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chamberlin, E., 1933, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clarke, E., 1971, Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, Public Choice, 8, 19–33.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coase, R. H., 1960, The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1–44.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coles, M., Malcomson, J.M., 1989, Contract Theory and Incentive Compatibility, in: Hey, J.D., (ed.), Current Issues in Microeconomics, Macmillan, 127–151.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coombs, C., 1964, Theory of Data, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cox, G.W., 1990, Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems, American Journal of Political Science, 34, 903–935.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dasgupta, P., Stiglitz, J., 1980, Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity, Economic Journal, 90, 266–293.

    Google Scholar 

  • Debreu, G, 1959, Theory of Value, New Haven.

    Google Scholar 

  • Demsetz, H., 1968, Why Regulate Utilities? Journal of Law and Economics, 11, 55–65.

    Google Scholar 

  • Diamond, P.A., Hausman, J.A., 1994, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better Than No Number?, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8, 45–64.

    Google Scholar 

  • Downs, A., 1957, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dreze J., 1964, Some Post-War Contributions of French Economists to Theory and Public Policy, American Economic Review.

    Google Scholar 

  • Duesenberry, J.S., 1949, Income, Savings and the Theory of Consumer Behavior, Cambridge Mass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dummett, M., 1984, Voting Procedures, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., Newman, P., 1989, (eds.), The New Palgrave: Allocation, Information and Markets, Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eekhoff, J., 1993, Wohnungspolitik, Tübingen,.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ellsberg, D., 1961, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75, 643–669.

    Google Scholar 

  • Endres, A., 1992, Ökonomische Grundlagen des Haftungsrechts, Darmstadt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Farrel, J., 1987, Information and the Coase Theorem, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1, 113–129.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feess, E., 1998, Umweltökonomie und Umweltpolitik, 2. Aufl. München.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fehr, E., K. Schmidt, 1999, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation, Quarterly-Journal-of-Economics; 114, 817–68..

    Google Scholar 

  • Fehr, E., Zych, P.K., 1995, Die Macht der Versuchung: Irrationaler Überkonsum in einem Suchtexperiment, Universität Wien, Mimeo.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fiorina, M.P., Voting behavior, in: Mueller, D.C., (ED.) Perspectives on Public Choice, a Handbook, Cambridge, 391–414.

    Google Scholar 

  • Forsythe, R., Kennan, J., Sopher, B., 1991, An Experimental Analysis of Strikes in Bargaining Games with One-Sided Private Information, American Economic Review, 81, 253–278.

    Google Scholar 

  • Forsythe, R., Palfrey, T.R., Plott, C.R., 1982, Asset Valuation in an Experimental Market, Econometrica, 50, 537–67.

    Google Scholar 

  • Franck, E., 1995, Die ökonomischen Institutionen der Teamsportindustrie, Wiesbaden.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frank, R., 1988, Passions Within Reasons. The Strategic Role of the Emotions, New York, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gibbard, A., 1973, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, Econometrica, 41, 587–602.

    Google Scholar 

  • Groves, T., Ledyard, J., 1977, Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the Free Rider Problem, Econometrica, 45, 783–809.

    Google Scholar 

  • Groves, T., Ledyard, J., 1987, Incentive Compatibility Since 1972, in: Groves, T., Radner, R., Reiter S. (eds.), Information, Incentives and Mechanisms. Essays in Honor of Leonid Hurwicz, Oxford, 8–111.

    Google Scholar 

  • Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., Schwarze, B., 1982, An Experimental Analysis of Ultimate Bargaining, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, 367–388.

    Google Scholar 

  • Güth, W., 1992, Spieltheorie und ökonomische Beispiele, Berlin et al.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hanemann, W. M., 1991, Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: How Much Can They Differ? American Economic Review, 81, 635–647.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hare T., 1859, Treatise on the Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hausman, J.A, (ED.), 1993, Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hey, J.D., 1991, Experiments in Economics, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hicks, J.R., 1939, Capital and Value, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hildenbrand, W., 1996, On the ‘Law of demand’, in: Debreu, G. (ed.), General Equilibrium Theory, Volume 2, Elgar Reference Collection no. 67, Brookfield, 261–283. (Im Original erschienen 1983).

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoffman, E., Mccabe, K., Shachat, K., Smith, V., 1994, Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 7, 346–370.

    Google Scholar 

  • Homann, K., Die Rolle ökonomischer überlegungen in der Grundlegung der Ethik, in: Hesse, H. (Hrsg.): Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Ethik, Berlin 1988, S. 215–240.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hotelling, H., 1929, Stability in Competition, Economic Journal, 39, 41–57.

    Google Scholar 

  • Inman, R., 1987, Markets, Government and the “New” Political Economy, in: Auerbach, A.J., Feldstein, M., (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, Vol II, Elsevier 647–778.

    Google Scholar 

  • Isaac R.M., Walker J.M., 1988, Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 179–199.

    Google Scholar 

  • Isaac, R.M., Walker J. M., Wlliams A.W., 1994, Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods, Journal of Public Economics, 54, 1–36.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kagel, J., Kim, CH., Moser, D., 1995, Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs, erscheint in: Games and Economic Behavior.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., Tversky, A., 1982, Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaldor, N., 1939, Welfare Propositions and Interpersonal Comparison of Utility, Economic Journal, XLIX, 549–552.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kirchgässner, G., 1991, Homo oeconomicus: Das ökonomische Modell individuellen Verhaltens und seine Anwendung in den Wirtschafts-und Sozialwissenschaften, Tübingen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Köhler, W., 1988, Handbuch der Wohnraummiete, 3. Aufl., München.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kosobud, R.S., 1991, Relative Income Hypotheses, in: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., Newman, P. (eds.) The New Palgrave, Vol. 4, London et al., 134–136.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kreps, D., 1992, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kreps, D., 1995, Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 77–89.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kreps, D. J., Milgrom, J., Robert, J., Wilson, R., 1974, Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 245–252.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kruse, J., 1985, Ökonomie der Monopolregulierung, Göttingen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kruse, J., 1987, Vertragsökonomische Interpretation der Regulierung, Jahrbuch für neue Politische Ökonomie, 6, 93–107.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kruse, J., 1988, Irreversibilitäten und natürliche Markteintrittsbarrieren, Jahrbuch für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 204, 508–517.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn, T.S., 1967, Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen, Frankfurt.

    Google Scholar 

  • lakatos, i., 1974, falsifikation und die methodologie wissenschaftlicher forschungsprogramme, in: lakatos, i., musgrave, a. (hrsg.), kritik und erkenntnisfortschritt, braunschweig.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leininger, W., 1992, The “Fatal” Vote, Diskussionspapier, Universität Dortmund, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leininger, W., 1993, More Efficient Rent-Seeking: A Münchhausen Solution, Public Choice, 75, 43–62.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leininger, W., Yang, C.-L., 1994, Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games, Games and Economic Behaviour, 7, 406–427.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levin, J., Nalebuff B., 1995, An Introduction to Vote Counting Schemes, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 3–29.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ledyard, J.O., 1981, The Paradox of Voting and Candidate Competition: A General Equilibrium Analysis, in: Horwich, G., Quirk, J. (EDS.), Essays in Contemporary fields of Economics, West Lafayette.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loomes, G., Sugden, R., 1982, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice under Uncertainty. Economic Journal, 92, 805–824.

    Google Scholar 

  • Luce, R.D., Raiffa, H., 1957, Games and Decision, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lupia, A., 1992, Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information, American Political Science Review, 86, 390–403.

    Google Scholar 

  • Machina, M.J., 1989, Choice and Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved, in: Hey, J.D., (ED.), Current Issues in Microeconomics, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maier,Gerhart 1989, Agrarpolitik, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn. (mit kommentiertem Literaturverzeichnis).

    Google Scholar 

  • Martin, S., 1993, Advanced Industrial Economics, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mckelvey, R.D., Ordeshook, P.C., 1985, Sequential Elections with Limited Information, American Journal of Political Science, 29, 480–512.

    Google Scholar 

  • Merrill, S., 1984, A Comparison of Efficiency of Multicandidate Electoral Systems, American Journal of Political Science, 28, 23–48.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meyers, R. und Worm, B., Rapid worldwide depletion of predatory fish communities, Nature, Vol 423, 2003, 280–283

    Google Scholar 

  • Meyerson, R., 1993, Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems, American Political Science Review, 87, 856–869.

    Google Scholar 

  • Michell, R.C., Carson R.T., 1989, Using Surveys to Value Public Goods, Washington D.C..

    Google Scholar 

  • Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., 1992, Economics, Organization and Management, Englewoog Cliffs.

    Google Scholar 

  • Millner, E. L., Pratt, M. D., 1981, An Experimental Investigation of Efficient Rent-Seeking, Public Choice, 62, 139–151.

    Google Scholar 

  • Millner, E. L., Pratt M. D., 1991, Risk Aversion and Rent-Seeking: An extension and some experimental evidence, Public Choice, 69, 81–92.

    Google Scholar 

  • MONOPOLKOMMISSION, 1989, Sondergutachten 18: Zusammenschlußvorhaben der Daimler-Benz AG mit Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm GmbH, Baden-Baden.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mueller, D.C., 1989, Public Choice II, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Musgrave, R.A., Musgrave, P.B., Kullmer, L., 1988, die öffentlichen Finanzen in Theorie und Praxis, Bd. 1-3, 4. Auflage, Tübingen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Myerson, R.B., 1991, Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Neale, W.C., 1964, The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 78, 1–14.

    Google Scholar 

  • Neu, W., Kruse J., 1993, Monopolpreiskontrollen in der Telekommunikation, in: Mestmäcker, E.J., (Hrsg.), Ordnungsprinzipien im Recht der Telekommunikation, Baden-Baden.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ng, Y.-K., 1981, Welfarism: A Defense against Sen’s Attack, The Economic Journal, 91, 527–530.

    Google Scholar 

  • Niskanen, W.A., 1968, The Peculiar Economicsof Bureaucracy, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 58, 293–305.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ochs, J., Roth A.E., 1989, An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining, American Economic Review, 79, 355–384.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ockenfels, A., 1999, Fairness, Reziprozität und Eigennutz–Ökonomische Theorie und experimentelle Evidenz. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ockenfels, A., Weimann, J., Types and Patterns: An Experimental East-West Comparison of Cooperation and Solidarity, Journal of Public Economics, 71, 1999, 275–287.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson, M., 1965, The Logic of collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ordeshook, P.C., The Spatial Analysis of Elections and committees: Four Decades of Research, in: Mueller, D.C., (ED.) Perspectives on Public Choice, a Handbook, Cambridge, 247–270.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom, E., 1990, Governing the Commons, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom, E., Gardner R., Walker J., 1994, Rules Games and Common-Pool Resources, Ann Arbor.

    Google Scholar 

  • Palfrey, T.R., Rosenthal, H., 1985, Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty, American Political Science Review, 79, 62.78.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paquè, K.-H., 1986, Philantropie und Steuerpolitik, Tübingen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paterson, I., Diekmann, A., 1988, A Paradox in Decision Theory and some Experimental Results: The Relative Nature of Decision, Theory and Decision, 25, 107–116.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pigou, A. C., 1923, The Economics of Welfare, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Plott, C.R., 1976, Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation, American Journal of Political Science, 20, 511–596.

    Google Scholar 

  • Plott, C.R., 1989, An Update Review of Industrial Organizations of Experimental Methods, in: Schmalensee, R., Willig, R.D. (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Vol. II, 1111–1176.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pollack, R.A., 1979, Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions and the Theory of Social Choice, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93, 73–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper, R.K., 1976, Die Logik der Forschung, 6. Aufl., Tübingen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Portney, P.R., 1994, The Contingent Valuation Debate: Why Economists Should Care. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8, 3–17.

    Google Scholar 

  • Posner, R.A., 1975, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, Journal of Law and Economics, 83, 807–827.

    Google Scholar 

  • Potters, J., van Winden, F., 1992, Lobbying ans Asymmetric Information, Public Choice, 74, 269–292.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rabin, M., 1993, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, American Economic Review, 83, 1281–1302.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rasmusen, E., 1991, Games and Information, Oxford, Reprinted 1991

    Google Scholar 

  • Richter, W.F., Schneider K., 1995, Competition for Stars and Audiences, Diskussionspapier, Universität Dortmund.

    Google Scholar 

  • Richter, W.F., Weimann, J., 1991, Meritorik, Verteilung und sozialer Grenznutzen vom Einkommen, Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft, 42, 118–130

    Google Scholar 

  • Richter, W.F., Wiegard, W., 1993, Zwanzig Jahre „Neue Finanzwissenschaft“, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-und Sozialwissenschaft, 113, 169–224.

    Google Scholar 

  • Riker, W.H., Ordeshook, P.C., 1968, A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, American Political Science Review, 76, 753–766.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A.E., Bargaining Experiments, in: Handbook of Experimental Economics, Kagel, J. H., Roth, A. E., (eds.), Princeton, 1995, 253–348.

    Google Scholar 

  • Satterthwaite, M.A., 1975, Strategy-Proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions, Journal of Economic Theory, 10, 187–217.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schneider, K., Weimann, J., Against all odds: Nash Equilibria in a Road Pricing Experiment, in: M. Schreckenberg und R. Selten (Hrsg.), Human Behavior and Traffic Networks, Springer Verlag, 2004, S. 133–153.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schöb, R., Weimann, J., Arbeit ist machbar. Die Magdeburger Alternative: Eine sanfte Therapie für Deutschland, 4. Aufl., Halle, 2005.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schulz, N., Weimann, J., 1989, Competition of Newspapers and the Location of Political Parties, Public Choice, 63,125–147.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schweizer, U., 1988, Externalities and the Coase Theorem: Hypothesis or Result?, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 144, 245–266.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scitovsky, T., 1941, A Note an Welfare Propositions in Economics, Review of Economic Studies, 9, 77–88.

    Google Scholar 

  • Selten, R., 1990, Bounded Rationality, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146, 649–658.

    Google Scholar 

  • Selten, R., Ockenfels, A., 1996, An Experimental Solidarity Game”, Diskussionspapier, Universität Magdeburg 1/1996

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen, A.K., 1979, Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: or What`s Wrong with Welfare Economics?, The Economic Journal, 89, 537–558.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen, A.K., 1981, A Reply to “Welfarism, a Defense against Sen’s Attack”, The Economic Journal, 91, 531–535.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen, A.K., 1986, Information and Invariance in Normative Choice, in: Heller, W.P., Starr, R.M., Starrett, D.A. (eds.), Social Choice and Public Decision Making, Vol 1. Essays in Honour of Kenneth J. Arrow, Cambridge S. 29–55.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen, A.K., 1987, Social Choice, in: Eatwell, J.,Milgate, M., Newman, P. (eds.), The New Palgrave, London et al., 382–393.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen, A.K., 1993, Internal Inconsistency of Choice, Econometrica, 61, 495–521.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen, A.K., 1995a, How to Judge Voting Schemes, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 91–98.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen, A.K., 1995b, Rationality and Social Choice, American Economic Review, 85, 1–24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simon, H. A., 1955, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69, 99–118.

    Google Scholar 

  • Singh, S., Fermats letzter Satz, München, 2000.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sinn, H.-W., Ist Deutschland noch zu retten, 4. Aufl., München, 2003.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sinn, G., Sinn, H.W., 1992, Kaltstart, Volkswirtschaftliche Aspekte der deutschen Vereinigung, 2. Aufl., Tübingen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Small, K. A., 1982, The Scheduling of Consumer Activities: Work Trips, American Economic Review 72, 467–479.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, V. L., 1962, An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior, Journal of Political Economy, 70, 111–137.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, V.L., 1989, Theory, Experiments and Economics, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, 151–169.

    Google Scholar 

  • Snyder, J.M., 1990, Campain Contributions as Investments: The US House of Representatives 1980-1986, Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1195–1227.

    Google Scholar 

  • Snyder, J.M., 1993, The Market for Campain Contributions: Evidence for the US Senate 1980-1986, Economics and Politics 5, 219–240.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taagepera, R., Shugart, M., 1989, Seats and Votes, New Haven.

    Google Scholar 

  • Takayama, A., 1969, Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraint. American Economic Review, 59, 255–260.

    Google Scholar 

  • Takayama, A., 1994, Analytical Methods in Economics, New York et al.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thaler, R., 1987, The Psychology of Choice and the Assumptions of Economics, in: Roth, A. (ed.): Laboratory Experimentation in Economics, Cambridge: University Press, 42–98.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tideman, N., 1995, The Single Transferable Vote, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 27–38.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tietz, R., Albers, W., Selten, R., (Hrsg.), 1988, Bounded Rational Behaviour in Experimental Games and Markets, Berlin et al.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tirole, J., 1988, The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tresch, R.W., 1981, Public Finance: A Normative Theory, San Diego.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, G., 1967, The Welfare Costs of Tarifs, Monopoly and Theft, Western Economic Journal, 5, 224–232.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, G., 1980, Effizient Rent-Seeking, in: Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R.D., Tullock G., (eds.), Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, Texas, 92–112.

    Google Scholar 

  • VAN Damme, E., 1987, Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, Berlin et al.

    Google Scholar 

  • Varian, H., 1994, Mikroökonomie, 3. Aufl., München.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vickrey, W., 1969, Congestion Theory and Transport Investment, American Economic Review, 59 (Papers and Proceedings), 251–261.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vickrey, W., 1961, Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders, Journal of Finance, 16, 1–17.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weimann, J., 1987, Normgesteuerte ökonomische Theorien, Frankfurt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weimann, J., 1993, Wirtschaftsethik und staatliches Handeln, in: Herder-Dorneich P., Schenk K.-E, Schmidtchen D., (Hrsg.), Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie, Bd. 12, Tübingen, 121–136.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weimann, J., 1994, Individual Behaviour in a Free Riding Experiment, Journal of Public Economics, 54, 185–200.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weimann, J., 1995a, Umweltökonomik, Eine theorieorientierte Einführung, 3. Auflage, Berlin et al.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weimann, J., 1995 b, Freifahrer im Test: Ein Überblick Über 20 Jahre Freifahrerexperimente, in: Ökonomie und Gesellschaft, Jahrbuch 12 Soziale Kooperation, 168–241.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weimann, J., Yang, C-L., Vogt, C., 2000, An Experiment on sequential Rent-Seeking, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 41, 405–426.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weimann, J., Yang, C-L., Vogt, C., 2002, Efficient Rent Seeking in Experiment, Public Choice, 110, 67–78.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wintrobe, R., 1997, Modern Bureaucratic Theory, in: Mueller, D.C., (ED.) Perspectives on Public Choice, a Handbook, Cambridge, 429–454.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, 1989, Entscheidungssammlung BMW 191, 39.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yang, C-L., 1994, Essays on the Theory of Rent-Seeking, Diss. Universität Dortmund.

    Google Scholar 

  • Young, H.P., 1974, An Axiomatization of Borda’s Rule, Journal of Economic Theory, 9, 43–52.

    Google Scholar 

  • Young, H.P., 1988, Condorcet`s Theory of Voting, American Political Science Review, 1231–1244.

    Google Scholar 

Zum Wahlparadoxon

  • Aldrich, J.H., 1997, When is it Rational to Vote?, in: Mueller, D.C., (ED.) Perspectives on Public Choice, a Handbook, Cambridge, 373–390.

    Google Scholar 

  • Downs, A., 1957, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • FIorina, M.P., 1997. Voting Behavior, in: Mueller, D.C., (ED.) Perspectives on Public Choice, a Handbook, Cambridge, 391–414.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kirchgässner, G., 1991, Homo oeconomicus: Das ökonomische Modell individuellen Verhaltens und seine Anwendung in den Wirtschafts-und Sozialwissenschaften, Tübingen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ledyard, J.O., 1981, The Paradox of Voting and Candidate Competition: A General Equilibrium Analysis, in: Horwich, G., Quirk, J. (EDS.), Essays in Contemporary Fields of Economics, West Lafayette.

    Google Scholar 

  • Palfrey, T.R., Rosenthal, H., 1985, Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty, American Political Science Review, 79, 62.78.

    Google Scholar 

  • Riker, W.H., Ordeshook, P.C., 1968, A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, American Political Science Review, 76, 753–766.

    Google Scholar 

Zum Parteienverhalten

  • Lupia, A., 1992, Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information, American Political Science Review, 86, 390–403.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mckelvey, R.D., Ordeshook, P.C., 1985, Sequential Elections with Limited Information, American Journal of Political Science, 29, 480–512.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ordeshook, P.C., The Spatial Analysis of Elections and Committees: Four Decades of Research, in: Mueller, D.C., (ED.) Perspectives on Public Choice, a Handbook, Cambridge, 247–270.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schulz, N., Weimann, J., 1989, Competition of Newspapers and the Location of Political Parties, Public Choice, 63, 125–147.

    Google Scholar 

Zum Verhalten von Interessengruppen

  • Austen-smith, D., 1997, Interest Groups: Money, Information and Influence, in: Mueller, D.C., (ED.) Perspectives on Public Choice, a Handbook, Cambridge, 296–321.

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker, G.S., 1983, A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 371–400.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson, M., 1965, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Potters, J., VAN Winden, F., 1992, Lobbying and Asymmetric Information, Public Choice, 74, 269–292.

    Google Scholar 

  • Snyder, J.M., 1990, Campaign Contributions as Investments: The US House of Representatives 1980-1986, Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1195–1227.

    Google Scholar 

  • Snyder, J.M., 1993, The Market for Campaign Contributions: Evidence for the US Senate 1980-1986, Economics and Politics 5, 219–240.

    Google Scholar 

Zum Bürokratie-Problem

  • Carroll, K.A., 1990, Bureaucratic Competition and Inefficiency: A Review of the Evidence, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 13, 21–40.

    Google Scholar 

  • Niskanen, W.A., 1968, The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 58, 293–305.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wintrobe, R., 1997, Modern Bureaucratic Theory, in: Mueller, D.C., (ED.) Perspectives on Public Choice, a Handbook, Cambridge, 429–45

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaft Lehrstuhl VWL III/Wirtschaftspolitik, Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, Universitätsplatz 2, 39106, Magdeburg

    Professor Dr. Joachim Weimann

Authors
  1. Professor Dr. Joachim Weimann
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaft Lehrstuhl VWL III/Wirtschaftspolitik, Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, Universitätsplatz 2, 39106, Magdeburg

    Joachim Weimann

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Weimann, J. (2006). Delegations-probleme in ReprÄsentativen Demokratien. In: Weimann, J. (eds) Wirtschaftspolitik. Springer-Lehrbuch. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28857-0_9

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28857-0_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-28856-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-28857-2

  • eBook Packages: Business and Economics (German Language)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation