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LITERATUR ZU KAPITEL 5
Für den gesamten Bereich kollektiver Entscheidungen dürfte
Mueller, D.C., Public Choice II, Cambridge 1989
das international anerkannte Standardlehrbuch sein. Weitere Lehrbücher bzw. lehrbuchhafte Darstellungen, auf die im Kap. 5 zurückgegriffen wurde (abgesehen von den bereits angegebenen Arbeiten von Inman und Kreps ):
Richter, W. F., Wiegard, W., Zwanzig Jahre „Neue Finanzwissenschaft“, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-und Sozialwissenschaft, 113, 1993, 169–224.
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Zur Contingent Valuation Methode (Sidestep 16)
Carson, R.T., Constructed Markets, in: Braden, J.B., Kolstad, C.D., (eds.), Measuring the Demand for Environmental Quality, Amsterdam et al. 1991, S. 121–161.
Carson, R.T., A Bibliography of Contingent Valuation Studies and Papers, La Jolla, 1994.
Diamond, P.A., Hausman, J.A., Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better Than No Number?, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8, 1994, 45–64.
Hausman, J.A, (ED.), Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment, New York 1993.
Michell, R.C., Carson, R.T., Using Surveys to Value Public Goods, Washington D.C., 1989.
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Zur Beurteilung von Wahlverfahren
Balinsky, M., Young, H.P., Fair Representation, New Haven, 1982.
Levin, J., Nalebuff, B., An Introduction to Vote Counting Schemes, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 1995, 3–26.
Taagepera, R., Shugart, M., Seats and Votes, New Haven 1989.
Sen, A.K., How to judge Voting Schemes, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 1995, 91–98.
Zu STV
Dummett, M., Voting Procedures, Oxford, 1984.
Hare T., Treatise on the Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal, London, 1859.
Tideman, N., The Single Transferable Vote, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 1995, 27–38.
Zur Coombs-Wahl
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Cox, G. W., Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems, American Journal of Political Science, 34, 1990, 903–935.
Meyerson, R., Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems, American Political Science Review, 87, 1993, 856–869.
Zum Arrow Theorem
Arrow, K.J., Social Choice and Individual Values, New York 1951; 2. Aufl. 1963.
Buchanan, J., 1954, Social Choice, Democracy and Free Markets, Journal of Political Economy, 62, 114–123.
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Sen, A.K., Information and Invariance in Normative Choice, in: Heller, W.P., Starr, R.M., Starrett, D.A. (eds.), Social Choice and Public Decision Making, Vol 1., Essays in Honour of Kenneth J. Arrow, Cambridge 1986, 29–55.
Zum Hotelling-Modell
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Kreps, D., Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 1995, 77–89.
Weitere wichtige Monographien und Aufsätze
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Clarke, E., Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, Public Choice, 8, 1971, 19–33.
Gibbard, A., Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, Econometrica, 41, 1973, 587–602.
Groves, T., Ledyard, J., Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the Free Rider Problem, Econometrica, 45, 1977, 783–809.
Groves, T., Ledyard, J., Incentive Compatibility Since 1972, in: Groves, T., Radner, R., Reiter S. (Eds.), Information, Incentives and Mechanisms. Essays in Honor of Leonid Hurwicz, Oxford 1987, 48–111.
Leininger, W., The “Fatal” Vote, Diskussionspapier, Universität Dortmund, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft, 1992.
Luce, R.D., Raiffa, H., Games and Decision, New York 1957.
Merrill, S., A Comparison of Efficiency of Multicandidate Electoral Systems, American Journal of Political Science, 28, 1984, 23–48.
Plott, C.R., Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation, American Journal of Political Science, 20, 1976, 511–596.
Pollack, R.A., Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions and the Theory of Social Choice, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93, 1979, 73–90.
Satterthwaite, M.A., Strategy-Proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions, Journal of Economic Theory, 10, 1975, 187–217.
Vickrey, W., Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders, Journal of Finance, 16, 1961, 1–17.
Young, H.P., Condorcet’s Theory of Voting, American Political Science Review, 1988, 1231–1244.
Young, H.P., An Axiomatization of Borda’s Rule, Journal of Economic Theory, 9, 1974, 43–52.
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Weimann, J. (2006). Kollektive Entscheidungen. In: Weimann, J. (eds) Wirtschaftspolitik. Springer-Lehrbuch. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28857-0_5
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