Summary
The Avatamsaka game is investigated both analytically and using computer simulations. The Avatamsaka game is a dependent game in which each agent’s payoff depends completely not on her own decision but on the other players’. Consequently, any combination of mixed strategies is a Nash equilibrium.
Analysis and evolutionary simulations show that the socially optimal state becomes evolutionarily stable by a Pavlovian strategy in the repeated Avatamsaka game, and also in any kind of dependent game. The mechanism of the evolutionary process is investigated from the viewpoint of the agent’s memory and mutation of strategies.
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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Akiyama, E., Aruka, Y. (2006). Evolution of Reciprocal Cooperation in the Avatamsaka Game. In: Namatame, A., Kaizouji, T., Aruka, Y. (eds) The Complex Networks of Economic Interactions. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 567. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28727-2_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28727-2_21
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