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Some Characterizations of Convex Games

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Recent Advances in Optimization

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 563))

Summary

Several characterizations of convexity for totally balanced games are presented. As a preliminary result, it is first shown that the core of any subgame of a nonnegative totally balanced game can be easily obtained from the maximum average value (MAV) function of the game. This result is then used to get a characterization of convex games in terms of MAV functions. It is also proved that a game is convex if and only if all of its marginal games are totally balanced.

This work has been supported by the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia (Spain) and the FEDER, project BEC2002-00642, and by the Departament d’Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informació, Direcció General de Recerca de la Generalitat de Catalunya, project 2001SGR-00162. The author thanks the support of the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA.

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Martínez-Legaz, J.E. (2006). Some Characterizations of Convex Games. In: Seeger, A. (eds) Recent Advances in Optimization. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 563. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28258-0_18

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