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Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities

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Book cover Social Choice and Strategic Decisions

Part of the book series: Studies in Choice and Welfare ((WELFARE))

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Washington University, St. Louis

    Randall L. Calvert

  2. Corporation for National and Community Service, USA

    Nathan Dietz

Authors
  1. Randall L. Calvert
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  2. Nathan Dietz
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL, 60208-2009, USA

    David Austen-Smith (Earl Dean Howard Distinguished Professor of Political Economy) (Earl Dean Howard Distinguished Professor of Political Economy)

  2. W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, 14627, USA

    John Duggan (Associate Professor of Political Science and Economics) (Associate Professor of Political Science and Economics)

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Calvert, R.L., Dietz, N. (2005). Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities. In: Austen-Smith, D., Duggan, J. (eds) Social Choice and Strategic Decisions. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27295-X_9

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