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Austen-Smith, D., Duggan, J. (2005). Introduction and Overview. In: Austen-Smith, D., Duggan, J. (eds) Social Choice and Strategic Decisions. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27295-X_1
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