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Exchange economies with asymmetric information: competitive equilibrium and core

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Differential Information Economies

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Theory ((ECON.THEORY,volume 19))

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Summary

Areplica theorem is shown to hold for exchange economies with asymmetric information. In a replicated exchange economy with asymmetric information the set of all core elements with equal treatment is nonempty, but it is in general only a subset of the core. Nevertheless, the replica theorem and the presence of at least one core element with equal treatment suffice to show existence of a competitive quasi-equilibrium. Conditions on the initial endowments and the communication system are given to ensure that every competitive quasi-equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium.

I thank an anonymous referee whose comments led to an improvement of the paper.

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Maus, S. (2005). Exchange economies with asymmetric information: competitive equilibrium and core. In: Glycopantis, D., Yannelis, N.C. (eds) Differential Information Economies. Studies in Economic Theory, vol 19. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-26979-7_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-26979-7_12

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-21424-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-26979-3

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